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ABSTRACT
The global land rush has spurred small, modest, and big anti-land grab
mobilizations, notably the food sovereignty movement. The movement has
been instrumental in representing the interests of small-scale family farmers
whose livelihoods are threatened by capitalist control over land in the
countryside. However, this dominant narrative tends to overlook or de-
emphasize some important diversity within the peasantry. In West Africa,
anti-land grab discourses emphasize family farming as a major collective
action frame, focusing less on issues related to agricultural wage labour –
farmworkers’ access to land, food, and decent working conditions. If food
sovereignty is to fully realize its potential power as a counter-narrative to
neoliberalism, and as a possible democratic alternative for working people
with diﬀerentiated and at times competing socio-economic interests, then
demands that adequately reﬂect the agrarian struggles of the rural working
people have to be put onto the agenda and engaged better than it is now.
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Introduction
In light of the global land rush and hegemony of neoliberal approaches to natural resource govern-
ance, agrarian justice movements are reviving and suggesting alternative ways of envisioning liveli-
hoods on land (Borras, Franco, & Suárez, 2015). One such alternative approach is food sovereignty1
which aims to restore and build peasants’ control over land, as ﬁrmly expressed in the 2007 declara-
tion of La Via Campesina, ‘Our land is our identity, it is not for sale … We need to ﬁght against all
forms of expulsion of peoples from their territories and against mechanisms that favour remote, cor-
porate or centralised control of territories… ’. It is for such reasons that the ‘land grab’ phenomenon
has become an eﬀective framing opportunity to raise awareness around the negative impacts of large-
scale land investments (Larder, 2015). In West Africa, Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de
Producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest2 (ROPPA) remains the most prominent food sovereignty move-
ment that campaigns for the sustenance of family farms as a counter-narrative to land grabs, and to
project an alternative outlook on agrarian futures in the sub-region (Mckeon, 2009a).
In this paper, I argue that while such anti-land grabbing discourses by food sovereignty move-
ments reﬂect historical and contextual struggles for the sustenance of the peasantry beyond survival,
the farmer-centred narratives tend to overlook or de-emphasize some important diﬀerentiation
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among, and diversity within the livelihoods of the peasantry. Thus this study aims to highlight farm-
workers’ struggles around land and the exploitative labour relations in rural West Africa. The goal is
to elucidate how and why issues of diﬀerentiation have been given little attention in discourses
against land grabs, and the implications for food sovereignty building.
This study relies mainly on secondary data sources: media reports, newsletters and campaign bro-
chures, and accounts of academics and activist researchers. It is further supported with ﬁndings and
reﬂections from an empirical study of the labour relations on a transnational oil palm plantation that
employs approximately 200–250 farmworkers in the Volta (Oti) Region of Ghana. The ﬁeldwork in
Ghana was conducted in 2018 and 2019, spanning approximately ﬁve months. The primary data was
gathered through a survey, interviews, informal conversations, observations and focus group discus-
sions with farmworkers on the plantation, management and supervisors, families who leased out
their lands, and some local government oﬃcials.
Land rush in the context of food insecurity in West Africa
West Africa is endowed with abundant land resources which contribute signiﬁcantly to its economic
growth (Hollinger & Staatz, 2015). For instance, West African smallholders produce 70% of the
world’s cocoa, and small-scale farming also contributes to over two-thirds of the region’s total
food production (Wessel & Foluke Quist-Wessel, 2015). Nevertheless, there is high food poverty
among farmers and the working poor as well as not disregarding inter and intra-country diﬀerences
(Hollinger & Staatz, 2015). For instance, in Northern Mali and the Lake Chad Basin, even though
food availability is generally satisfactory, civil instability continues to drive severe food insecurity.
Also, while market ﬂuctuations aﬀect national food security in Ghana and Nigeria, diverse factors
inﬂuence the in-country diﬀerentiation between the northern and southern divides of the two
countries (FAO, 2017), not to mention the fragile ecosystems and droughts in the Sahelian areas
(Mortimore, 2003). Family farmers also have to be more productive to meet the growing food
demands of urban and rural populations as well as the income and employment needs of rural popu-
lations (Bélières, Bosc, Faure, Fournier, & Losch, 2002).
Colonial and Post-colonial policies have inﬂuenced the food insecurity in West Africa. Both
the shortcomings of newly independents states’ food self-suﬃciency programmes in the 1960s
and the failures market liberalization under the structural adjustment programmes of the
early 1980s cannot be overlooked (Burnett & Murphy, 2014; Oya, 2006). The present hegemony
of free trade has also inﬂuenced states to open up their markets to low-priced food imports – a
situation which encourages dumping, alters food preferences, and systemically stiﬂes local pro-
duction. In the Sahel region of West Africa, foreign foods like noodles that were culturally
unsuitable decades ago are now normalized and compete with local foodstuﬀ (Sahel and
West Africa Club, 2007).
Consequently, contemporary land deals characterized by both new land acquisitions and existing
investments under new contracts are being promoted by states, traditional authorities, communities,
and agribusinesses under the rhetoric of increased productivity, growth, and food security. For
example, a 2009World Bank report with a special focus onWest Africa, describes the Guinea Savan-
nah Zone3 as ‘empty lands’ that should be harnessed for investments without adequately recognizing
the prevalence and social relevance of shifting cultivation, fallow systems, and pastoralism (see
Richards, 2018) and the land needs of future generations.
That said, Western investors and partnerships are critical players in the oil palm and non-tra-
ditional export sector in West Africa (Amanor, 2012). Yet in recent years, the so-called rising powers
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have also been playing new roles in agricultural investments, with almost one-ﬁfth of land deals in
West Africa involving China, Brazil, and India.4 In 2011, China launched the West Africa regional
oﬃce of the China-African Development Fund5 (CADFund) in Accra to facilitate and accelerate
the industrialization and agricultural modernization in West Africa (Cousins, Borras, Sauer, &
Ye, 2018). Other examples include Brazil’s involvement in commercial rice production in Ghana
for both domestic and international markets, and other ancillary investments from China in the
form of irrigation services, agro-processing, agricultural technology and research in Senegal,
Mali, and Ghana (Amanor, 2013; Bräutigam & Xiaoyang, 2009). Evidence from the land grab
online databank6 also suggests the growing presence of Singapore, Malaysia, and Nigeria in
large-scale agricultural investment in West Africa. In all of these developments, the role of national
elites cannot be overstated – the state, local agricultural entrepreneurs and traditional authorities
who operate on their own and in diverse partnerships with foreign elites to facilitate land deals
(Keene, Walsh-Dilley, Wolford, & Geisler, 2015). Many of such partnerships for agricultural
land investments tend to put control in the hands of landholding and capitalist elites (McKay,
2017), often to the disadvantage of peasant livelihoods – a condition which food sovereignty move-
ments actively resist.
The resurgence of family farming discourses in West Africa and the rise of the global food sover-
eignty movement have therefore raised international awareness about the persistence of the peasan-
try and the implications of capitalist development in rural frontiers (Mckeon, 2009b; Moyo, 2016;
Zoundi & Hitimana, 2011). Nonetheless, for the movement’s inﬂuence to transcend agenda-setting
and engage in relevant policy interventions, its claims and demands have to be adequately linked to
the ongoing questions of agrarian transformations and diﬀerentiation within the peasantry as will be
illustrated below.
Dominant narratives in the food sovereignty discourse in West Africa
Compared to Latin America, the food sovereignty movement has a less established base in Africa.
Nonetheless, numerous organizations, networks, and platforms at national, regional, and continent
levels are engaged in food sovereignty related campaigns and advocacy. Their campaigns are not
mere replications of the La Via Campesina principles but are often shaped by their local or regional
contexts and histories (Gyapong, 2017). For example, whereas land reform is central to the Food
Sovereignty Campaign (FSC) in southern Africa due to their history of class and racial oppression
(Wesso, 2009), the West African campaign is critical of free trade and thus, calls for equitable inte-
gration of smallholders into global markets.
As a network of producer organizations from 13 out of the 157 Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), ROPPA remains the most massive regional mobilization for food
sovereignty in Africa (Mckeon, 2009a). Through an alliance with La Vía Campesina, ROPPA
has also strengthened its political recognition and has been a key player in promoting that regional
agricultural policies be family farm oriented (Johnson et al., 2008). Since its inception in 2002,
ROPPA maintains that it has positioned itself to defend the rights of peasants – referring to
men and women, small-scale family farmers, pastoralists, artisanal ﬁsher folks, forest dwellers, indi-
genous peoples and agricultural and ﬁsheries workers, including migrants, who cultivate, grow,
harvest, and process food within a rural community (La Via Campesina, 2013; ROPPA, 2014a).
Food sovereignty movements’ use of ‘peasants’ is a strategy to draw attention to the special
relationship rural people have with land, to highlight their social and economic rights and political
identity, including also, their cultural and religious lives (McMichael, 2015). In the 2006 Niamey
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call for West African food sovereignty, ROPPA and its alliances contextualized food sovereignty in
West Africa as
the right of every country or group of countries to deﬁne their agricultural policies in the interests of
their populations, to develop and protect their productive activities and their markets so that they
can satisfy the populations’ demand for suﬃcient healthy food which is culturally and religiously accep-
table and, at the same time, constitute the basis for fair remuneration of the labour of family farms.
(ROPPA, 2006a, p. 1)
ROPPA’s vision for food sovereignty in West Africa is inspired by the several post-independence
government policy attempts towards food self-suﬃciency in the sub-region. As such, ROPPA’s
demands centre on trade restrictions, against liberalized markets, and to ensure that family farming
systems are not taken over by large-scale industrialized schemes. In defence of fair trade rather than
free trade, Mamadou Cissokho, the honorary president of ROPPA in 20018 put forward the move-
ment’s position: ‘We must attack the rules of play! Those who defend free trade have been preparing
themselves for it over the past ﬁfty years… , It is important and non-negotiable that we beneﬁt from
the same things in our countries’. Thirteen years on, another leader of ROPPA, Djigbo Bagna, in his
response to an interview asking about the challenges of farmers, emphasized the role of farmers in
ensuring food security (ROPPA, 2014b). Among other issues, including the lack of purchasing power
and the challenge of climate change, he iterated the question of trade, saying ‘for me to be well, the
selling price should be higher than the production price, and this is the ﬁrst problem’.
When we turn to the issues of land grabs, campaigns by ROPPA and other national level food
movements have advanced in three (3) main interrelated ways. First, land grabs threaten the history,
recognition and the valorization of family farms. Mainstream discourses and programmes that pro-
mote uncontrolled large-scale agricultural land investments tend to shove family farming to a sub-
culture that is under-valued and poorly recognized (ROPPA, 2014c). As further explained by Nora
McKeon in a ROPPA newsletter,
Africa’s food security is without any shadow of a doubt based on the diversiﬁed production models
adopted by its millions of family farmers and their links to those who consume their products. There
is a severe disconnect between this reality and the model that is being proposed by these corporate-
led programmes and, alas, enthusiastically accepted by many African governments and the leadership
of the AU/ NEPAD/CAADP. There is a severe disconnect between rhetorical recognition of the key
role played by Africa’s smallholder family farmers and the fact that family farming is portrayed as an
archaic model which is incapable of evolution. (ROPPA, 2014c, p. 43)
Family farming covers a broad range of situations; however, they are generally characterized by the
particular connection between the structure and composition of the household, assets and farming
activities, and they are also generally dependent on unpaid family/household labour (Toulmin &
Gueye, 2003).9 Family farming makes up a signiﬁcant share of rural people’s way of life in West
Africa. Several studies have demonstrated the persistence of small-scale family farming practices
due to their adaptability (Gyasi, 1994), robustness (Bélières et al., 2002), and embeddedness in strong
family relations and cultural bonds; what Ngwainmbi (2000) refers to as the ‘economy of aﬀection’.
Contrary to predictions of the demise of the peasantry, family farming persists even under unfavour-
able policy environments (Amanor, 2012). Carrere (2013, p. 47) has argued that even during the
British colonial administration, ‘the peasant system was considered a tried and tested method of pro-
ducing tropical export crops’ – e.g. cocoa in Ghana. As such, the purpose of the colonial regime was
not to replace the peasant system of production with large-scale schemes completely but to ﬁnd
‘innovative’ ways of improving their integration into ‘competitive’ markets. In comparison to
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large-scale commercial production schemes that have emerged since the advance of capitalism,
family farms have proven to be relatively more resilient than previously predicted. Jan Douwe
van der Ploeg (2010) reiterates the persistence of new peasantries with more diversiﬁed and resilient
strategies in their livelihoods. Thus, arguments that simplistically assume and aim for their liquida-
tion or replacement by large-scale production systems are becoming increasingly less convincing.
Second, peasant or small-scale farmers bear the brunt of land and resource grabs through dispos-
session and loss of livelihoods (La Via Campesina, 2015; ROPPA, 2006b). This dominant claim is
often projected in contrast to mainstream perspectives that show optimism about the development
potentials of regulated land deals (see Deininger et al., 2011). The dispossession narrative does not
only emerge from the discourses of (West African) food sovereignty movements but also resonates
with several theoretical postulations and empirical research on the impacts of historical enclosures
and contemporary large-scale land acquisitions (Hall, 2013; Levien, 2013; Fonjong, Sama-Lang,
Fombe, & Abonge, 2016; Nyantakyi-Frimpong & Bezner Kerr, 2017). In 2012, the leadership of
ROPPA played vital roles in the Food and Agricultural Organization’s (FAO) committee for food
security to reject and suggest alternatives to the World Bank’s principles for responsible investments
for legitimatizing land grabs instead of protecting the needs of family farmers10 (ROPPA, 2014a).
Internal diﬀerentiation within the peasantry is a widely recognized phenomenon in agrarian
development – even as this is interpreted diﬀerently by Marxist and moral economy perspectives.
Food sovereignty movements are often found in contested positions, having to present broad claims
and demands in defence of the peasantry as a whole but are also aware of the class struggles and
diﬀerentiated interests (Edelman & Borras, 2016). When they frame issues broadly, they present
the peasantry as a political category that acts as a unifying frame for making known the struggles
of the people of the land (McMichael, 2015), but this also increases the tendencies of oversimplifying
complex issues.
Third, small-scale farming is often more productive and sustainable than large-scale models. This
counter-narrative falls in line with the widely observed phenomenon and the theoretical debate on
the inverse relationship between farm size and farm productivity (Lipton, 2006). After Sen’s (1962)
farmmanagement surveys in India, the relationship between size and yield became central to debates
on agrarian development. Critics of the smallholder farming systems often question their pro-
ductivity, eﬃciency, and competitiveness. Given the low agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan
Africa, Collier and Dercon (2014, p. 94) caution against the celebration of smallholder farms as a
superior model of production. Collier and Dercon do not necessarily disregard the growing evidence
of the eﬃciency of smallholder farms. Nonetheless, from a methodological standpoint, they chal-
lenge such eﬃciency claims, arguing that in Africa, it is usually more of a celebration of the relative
successes within small farms than actual comparison with large farms.
However, van der Ploeg (2014, p. 1004) argues that ‘when looking at land productivity, – the most
important lens from the perspective of environmental sustainability – peasant farms generally
achieve higher levels of production per unit of land than capitalist or entrepreneurial farms’. This
perspective underlies much of the economic justiﬁcation for the food sovereignty movements’ oppo-
sition to land grabs. Resonating with van der Ploeg (2014) is the movement’s defence of the capa-
bility of family farms to produce (more than) suﬃcient good food for the households of family
farmers and the growing world population. This translates into the ‘Africa can feed itself’ campaign
in West Africa. ROPPA maintains that family farms can feed Africa’s growing population, create
jobs, and wealth if they are not perceived as backward or as only capable of subsistence and therefore
supported with inclusive and bottom-up research and policies (ROPPA, 2014b). Already, about 80%
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of the food grown in Africa is done by small-scale family farmers (GRAIN, 2014), so with the ade-
quate support, the continent will not have to rely on large-scale agricultural models.
Family farming is also often implied in the recent discourses on agroecology, whereby peasant
practices are seen to be built on contextualized and diversiﬁed farming systems rooted in years of
long term experimentation, local knowledge and practices that are more climate-resilient and eco-
logically beneﬁcial than industrialized production models (Pimbert, 2006; Rosset &Martinez-Torres,
2012). In his interview for the ‘vision paysannes’magazine (ROPPA, 2014c, p. 18), Djibo Bagna11em-
phasized the complementary nature of the agro-ecological zones in the Sahel and Coastal West
Africa and how they support family farming in sustainable ways. These arguments are often
made in contradistinction to ‘industrialized production methods, which damage the environment
and contribute to global warming’ (La Via Campesina, 2007).12
Certainly, many social and scientiﬁc studies caution against the destructive aspects of large-scale
agriculture by stressing the prevalence and incidences of excessive waste generation, pollution and
destruction of biodiversity, high dependence on chemicals and the growth of herbicide-tolerant
weeds as well as other health and social implications (Schneider & Sharma, 2014; Thompson
et al., 2006; Woodhouse, 2012). However, within the food sovereignty movement, agroecology
does not necessarily conﬂict with modern science but rejects the pre-eminence of and total depen-
dence on the latter. Thus peasants should have the right to be selective about scientiﬁc methods that
complement their local practices.
Farmworkers: in the countryside and in food sovereignty narratives
As it has already been established, the promotion of family farms stands tall in the agenda for food
sovereignty and in anti-land grab discourses in West Africa. What seems to be lacking in the narra-
tive on the valorization of family farms is a linkage to its diversity and the changes that have occurred
over time, especially concerning the labour question. Several west African studies have pointed out to
the transformations in the family farming system – the growing fragmentation of large households,
nucleation, individualization, and seasonal variation in household dynamics which the idealized
descriptions of family farms tend to overlook (NEPAD, 2013; Touré & Seck, 2005).
Also, as a farming system which functions both as a production unit and a complex social organ-
ization, family farmers have, and continue to experience changes in their modes of production and
reproduction, particularly in the labour dynamics. The literature on family farms in West Africa is
scanty, but there is evidence of substantive and complex wage labour relations among family farmers
(Amanor, 2010; Van Hear, 1984). Unlike the Russian peasant that Chayanov studied, peasant farm-
ing today is embedded in a ‘new rurality’ (Kay, 2015) and it is in this light that ROPPA envisions, and
campaigns for the ‘modernisation of family farming to feed Africans, creating jobs and wealth’
(ROPPA, 2014b, p. 4)
While earlier research in Ghana by Van Hear (1984) attributed the viability of the family farm as
being a fall-back haven for members, recent studies reveal otherwise. Many youths do not ﬁnd farm-
ing attractive due to declining returns, inadequate government support and growing urbanization13
that propel them to pursue non-existent oﬀ-farm and city jobs (Ariyo & Mortimore, 2012; Richards,
2005). There is also a declining moral economy, intergenerational struggles and control of youth by
elders which are manifested on the one hand, in the increasing withdrawal of youth’s labour services
in family farms, and on the other hand, the increase in land sales and sharecropping (Amanor, 2010).
When the youth choose to engage in farming, many would instead become labourers and sharecrop-
pers outside their family lands where their remuneration is guaranteed. In such cases, they also
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compete with migrant farmworkers. Some of these family farms are also diﬀerentiated in assets and
resources. Again, in some cases, wage labour needs may not necessarily emanate from a lack of
family labour, rather from expanded reproduction for both consumption and marketing (Bernstein,
2010). There are instances when family farm heads and other household members sell oﬀ their
labour supply to other farms to supplement family income needs for social and economic purposes.
Such incidences usually arise from challenging livelihood contexts related to land degradation (West,
2018), and under unfavourable rural agricultural policy environments (Scoones, 2015; Windfuhr &
Jonsén, 2005), as well as the impacts of colonial legacies. As rightly indicated by Bernstein (2010),
colonial trends of commodiﬁcation began with the introduction of cash crops and the forced com-
mercialization of crops, a means of consumption and production which made wage labour supply
necessary.
Unlike La Via Campesina Latin America, where farmworkers receive ample attention in food
sovereignty campaigns, perhaps because they have more organized associations (Edelman & Borras,
2016), in West Africa, farmworkers most often appear among the list of rural folks or ‘people of the
land’. However, in the movement’s demand framings, they are generally conﬂated with farmers. In
the Niamey call for West Africa food sovereignty, the demand for ‘fair remuneration of the labour of
family farms’ shows the movement’s interests in beneﬁcial trade (ROPPA, 2006a), but at the same
time, it emanates from the ‘unpaid’, ‘small-scale’ ‘family labour – family farms analogy’. Disposses-
sion-focused framings tend to push issues of rural wage workers – their food security, access to land
and labour conditions – to the margins of land grab and food sovereignty debates.
In food sovereignty discourses, ‘local-global’ and ‘capitalist-peasants’ narratives of inequality hap-
pen to take precedence over other localized issues. All the same, In many West African countries,
traditional cash crops are produced mainly by the not-so-poor family farmers, and are based on
proﬁtability and expanded reproduction. It is therefore not suﬃcient to say their capitalist intentions
are just a matter of a small degree. Similarly, in outgrower schemes where family farmers are them-
selves exploited by large corporations, their farmworkers become the ﬁnal ‘consumers’ of the costs in
such contracts – through low wages and tedious working conditions (Baglioni, 2015). In many rural
economies with informal labour systems, when a farmer or landless person falls into the labouring
class, their power and autonomy plummet. All the same, farmworkers also defy homogenous
descriptions and, as mentioned earlier, many of them double as farmers and petty commodity pro-
ducers (Gyapong, 2019).
For food sovereignty movements in West Africa to adequately address food insecurity and the
agrarian struggles of the working poor, the everyday relations between (family) farmers and farm-
workers have to be empirically assessed to illuminate the contradictions and intricacies that arise
on the ground in eﬀorts to protect labourers and food sovereignty (Bowles, 2013). As Kay (2015,
p. 80) argues, ‘the problems of peasant farming and rural wage labour are not unconnected, but
rural wage workers raise particular issues that have not yet been fully discussed’.
Dispossession, but also exploitation: diﬀerentiated impacts and responses
Empirical evidence has been growing on the political economy of land grabs, revealing the diﬀeren-
tiated implications on land relations and land-use changes in rural agrarian societies (Borras &
Franco, 2012; Hall et al., 2015). For instance, a study in Ghana by Boamah (2014) showed the sig-
niﬁcant role of chiefs in determining the impacts of land deals. In one case, migrant farmers who had
defaulted the payment of ground rents to chiefs had their lands aﬀected, whereas in another case,
migrant charcoal producers who often paid their tributes were protected from dispossession
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(Boamah, 2014, p. 419). For farmers who may not necessarily be evicted, they also have to deal with
declining farm-gate prices and increasing competition from large-scale investors who are inserted
into logistical chains and economies of scale which capture production and displace struggling small-
holders (Amanor, 2012). Land grabs exacerbate the predicaments women when land transfers deny
them of their usufruct entitlements; when land-use changes and reclassiﬁcation reduce their land
rights, and when land formalization and the compensation packages transform the rules of access
to favour men (Behrman, Meinzen-Dick, & Quisumbing, 2012; Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003). Never-
theless, the situation could be even more complicated. For instance, in some settings, women advo-
cacy groups show optimism in market-led land policies even when they recognize that the power
relations that structure demands tend to favour men. This is because they perceive it as an oppor-
tunity for women to circumvent discriminatory customs that limit their access and control over land
(Tsikata, 2003).
When land grabs transform land ownership and use, the agrarian question of labour becomes
inevitable. How large-scale production schemes result in labour redundancy or generate employ-
ment for rural people (especially the land dispossessed) is usually complex (Julia & White, 2012;
Li, 2011). The absorption of rural labour is not always assured when there are no matching skills
or suitable agribusiness models. Contrary to mainstream assumptions that regulations should facili-
tate job creation, not only are states unable to eﬀectively monitor employment outcomes, existing
regulatory frameworks which are mostly voluntary are also not binding for investors (Gyapong,
2019).
All the same, even in cases where employment is created, job opportunities are often gendered. In
a recent study conducted in Ghana, Kenya and Zambia by Hall, Scoones, and Tsikata (2017), there
were instances where land deals have created more paid jobs for males, permanent, and highly qua-
liﬁed workers than females and wage labourers. The type of crops grown also determines who gets
employed. There is a growing feminization of labour in large-scale horticulture agribusinesses
(Dolan & Humphrey, 2000). It is a reﬂection of the broadening scope of agrarian change in many
rural societies, coupled with enabling customary institutions that inﬂuence investors’ preference
for women, deemed to have ‘nimble ﬁngers’, are less conﬂictual and more willing than men to accept
lower wages (Bernstein, 2010; Kay, 2015). On the other hand, for other crops like oil palm and sugar
cane, the task division of labour favours men over women and is therefore accompanied by wide
wage disparities. On the oil palm plantation in Ghana, women constitute just about a quarter of
the working population and obtain lower incomes than men. They are engaged primarily in loose
picking and weeding, compared to men who, also as a result of their physical attributes, can have
opportunities in over 12 diﬀerent tasks. Thus, during seasonal task variations, women beneﬁt less
in terms of job opportunities, and a larger percentage of women than men are laid oﬀ during the
lean seasons (Gyapong, 2019).
At the same time, the existing and sometimes contested institutional contexts within which land
grabs occur inﬂuence their impacts on the distribution of resources and labour relations. On the one
hand, states’ imperative toward the accumulation of capital and the maintenance of legitimacy deter-
mine the limits of and possibilities for large-scale investments. On the other hand, their authority
and capacity to regulate land and labour resources for large-scale investment also bring about var-
iegated implications on diﬀerent classes of labour and rural inhabitants (Fox, 1992; Moreda, 2016;
Schiavoni, 2016).
Similarly, customary institutions of land tenure and production systems, traditional practices and
norms (e.g. gender roles) also add to the dynamics of impacts. In a study by Amanor (2012) in the
cocoa sector of Cote d’Ivoire, although the liberalization of agricultural markets and the collapse of
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state marketing boards eroded the bargaining power of smallholders, the small-scale production sys-
tem of cocoa remained untouched because of the enshrined and well established historical and cul-
tural relations of production. In such traditional institutional contexts, smallholders in cocoa
production face fewer risks of eviction compared to non-traditional cash crop sectors (e.g. pineapple
cultivation in Ghana). This could have an impact on the extent to which farmers in particular crop
sectors would identify with, and be progressive or radical with the notions of food sovereignty. Many
critical studies have also exposed how customary institutions of land tenure, norms, and social
relations inherently discriminate and marginalize women in their access to and control over land
(Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003). For instance, in the Herakles- Volta Red Oil palm land deal in
Ghana that I studied, not only did the institution of male authority in families facilitate women’s
removal from the land acquisition process, women did not beneﬁt duly from the distribution of
rents that were controlled by male family heads/representatives.
Thus far, women stand a high risk of being cash-strapped and unable to beneﬁt from land
resources fully, and therefore become attracted to wage labour on large-scale farms, even when
they have to work under exploitative labour relations (Julia & White, 2012; Tsikata & Yaro,
2013). Women in particular, when incorporated as wage labourers and contract farmers, are often
caught in a complex web of being attracted to (seasonal) livelihood diversiﬁcation and economic
empowerment opportunities while at the same time, being exposed to structural vulnerabilities
posed by institutions that ‘work together’ to beneﬁt and marginalize them. In the Ghana case
study for example, given the pre-existing customary/domestic institutions, it was not surprising
that many women14 are more concerned about job opportunities and labour conditions than ques-
tioning the land acquisition itself15 Similar accounts have been reported by Levien (2017) and Park
and White (2017) in their work in Asia and other parts of Africa.
Every day,men andwomenaﬀected by land grabs, given diﬀerent relations of agency, structural and
institutional processes, showdiverse forms of political reactions, some of which could even undermine
the vision of food sovereignty. These often manifest in ways that may not always be as overt protests
but through everyday politics, in the form of ‘production and action’. Responses toward land grabs
‘extend far beyond “resistance” in its many manifestations – to demands for compensation, insertion
and even counter-mobilizations against land deal resisters’ (Hall et al., 2015, p. 467). Evidence of such
occurrences has been reported on the Malibya project in Mali which involved the transfer of 100,000
hectares of land for an irrigation project. Those who lost their land embarked on outright resistance,
less landed farmers saw it as an opportunity for improved yields, and the state has even rationalized it
as a pathway to national food sovereignty (Larder, 2015). When food sovereignty movements engage
with some of these complex realities, it will imply dealing with contradictions of interests but also pro-
voke discussions based on the real experiences, diﬀerent forms of vulnerabilities and the domestic
power relations within which land grabs are embedded.
The changing agricultural values and agrarian futures in West Africa
The issues above reveal the diversity, complexity, and ﬂuidity in the processes of change in rural agrar-
ian systems. It is also becoming quite apparent that some of the tensions between the food sovereignty
ideals (of protecting local food systems through small-scale/ family farm production and local con-
sumption) and the interests of its mass base (the rural masses) may also lie in the diﬀerences in values
and ideologies on how agriculture should be developed to beneﬁt people on the ground. In ROPPA,
there is a growing emphasis on themodernization/valorization/professionalization of family farming,
althoughwithout a clear strategy. Thismodernization of family farming is usually linked to discussions
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on equitably integrating farmers into (regional) markets and promoting demands for their products,
yet some farmersmayperhaps consider it as an avenue to fully transform their production systems. For
instance, a leader of the Ghana national platform of ROPPA (who also coordinated an Alliance for
GreenRevolution inAfrica-AGRAproject inGhana) at some point registered his admiration for com-
mercial agriculture and ‘how small-scale farmers could one day be commercial farmers’16 This is not
too surprising given that the class base of the Ghana platform seems to be that of mainly middle-rich
farmers. Family farmersmay not necessarily practice what is preached about the productivity and sus-
tainability of small-scale farming, even when showing real concerns about their agrarian conditions
and struggles. Women and youth are, for instance, attracted to wage work on large farms to meet
their daily livelihoods, even when they are aware of the sustainability implications for them and
their societies. Again, when some farmers are keen to engagewith globalmarkets to improve their live-
lihoods, some may not be averse to the intensive use of weedicides or experimenting with genetically
modiﬁed seeds. For example, in Ghana, seeds of contestation have erupted around a planned govern-
ment introduction of GM cowpea17 seeds. Whereas Food Sovereignty Ghana (FSG) and the Peasant
FarmersAssociation ofGhana (PFAG)have been active voices through lawsuits and campaigns calling
for a complete ban of the introduction of GMOs18 inGhana, theGhanaNational Association of Farm-
ers and Fishermen (GNAFF) 19 actively support GMOs for food security and poverty reduction.20
Taken together, the food sovereignty discourse should not simply reﬂect ‘the pros and cons of a par-
ticular set of technologies, but about politics and values and the future of agrarian society’ (Scoones,
2008, p. 315).
Many of these conﬂicting values may even not conform to particular class interests but emerge out
of the changing rurality – peasants’ histories, their routes into peasantry and the social contexts that
shape their desires, behaviour, and values (Hyden, 1986). Although some may be family farmers by
‘choice’, for others, peasantry could be just a coping strategy and externally imposed – those who are
‘trapped’ by poverty-driven urban-rural migration, social and family demands; taking care of the
aged or sick, marriage relations and perhaps other economic hardships such as failed business ven-
tures. Many of these examples were evident during my ﬁeldwork in Ghana. If the peasants of today
do not compare to Chayanovian descriptions and have diverse raisons d’être, then it cannot be
assumed that they have equal degrees of intrinsic attachment to land. For example, communal,
stool21 and state lands mean diﬀerently to diﬀerent people of the land, and perceptions of their pre-
sent and future beneﬁts to the community and how they should be put to productive use may diﬀer.
A small-scale ‘family farmer’ who tills an inherited family land and a small-scale individual farmer
who acquired his land through personal purchase could have diﬀerent reactions to land sale/lease.
Economically, those who receive substantial returns from non-farm activities may perceive land
diﬀerently from full-time farmers. Closely linked is the usually neglected question of what form
of attachment do people have to the land? As working owners, absentee owners, workers/labourers,
settlers? For landless farmworkers, not only might their economic relationship with land be relatively
stronger than that of the ‘somewhat pure peasant – family farmers’, they could also have stronger
relationships to land in its communal logic than in personal terms.
Transcending the dynamic rural systems, the broad socio-economic contexts within which pea-
sants ﬁnd themselves could also shape their ideologies and interests in food sovereignty and the
issues of land grabs. In many developing countries, peasants are still second-class citizens with de
facto restrictions on their geographical mobility and with limited access to social services (Edelman,
2013). The extreme levels of socio-economic inequality expressed in the inequitable share of socio-
economic infrastructures like schools, healthcare facilities, potable water, electricity, communication
technologies, and good transportation networks, bring a very distinct dimension to the ﬁght for
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peasants’ rights in such contexts. Peasant parents in West Africa increasingly invest in their chil-
dren’s education in the hope that their future working lives would not be spent in peasant agriculture
(Bryceson, 2000, p. 44). In my research in Ghana, it was not surprising to ﬁnd out that almost all of
the farmworkers on the plantations had education as their raison d’être, i.e. to earn income to either
sponsor their own education (often the case of young males) and move to the service sector or spon-
sor their children (mostly from the accounts of adults, uneducated women workers). A worker stated
ﬁrmly,
I do not want my children to suﬀer like me. I will support them if they want to go to school and farm
alongside, but not to depend entirely on farming. It is tedious, and the income is not stable. (Fieldwork,
2018)
Overall, these examples iterate the cash needs of peasants in socially deprived and fragile climatic
environments, who are squeezed between declining agricultural returns and poor access to basic
needs. For most peasants living under such social conditions, their land-related interests in relation
to food sovereignty principles, may only be sustained by improvements in the social conditions of
their families and households.
Conclusion
This paper has highlighted the complexities of agrarian transformations within which food sover-
eignty has to be constructed in light of a raging land rush. Food sovereignty movements in West
Africa have to engage better with some of these ongoing changes which are in themselves rooted
in international and local political-economic structures but unfortunately, have become the lived
realities of the diverse rural working people. It is such a reality that propels the antagonism between
food sovereignty and corporate agriculture and at the same time, drives campaigns for the valoriza-
tion of peasant food systems. However, these ongoing agrarian transformations have also inﬂuenced
the diﬀerentiation of the peasantry, including the landed and landless farmers and farmworkers,
petty commodity producers, migrant workers, women, and other minorities groups who may
have diverse experiences and interests in land deals. This is usually accompanied by diverse and
unpredictable short-term livelihood strategies, some of which may even challenge the vision of
food sovereignty. Hence, for food sovereignty campaigns to have more signiﬁcant inﬂuence beyond
political mobilization and agenda-setting to reﬂect the agrarian struggles of the diﬀerentiated rural
working poor, movement leaders may have to engage with questions of ongoing rural livelihood
transformations. In 2015, ROPPA conducted a workshop with its national platforms, focusing on
the observation and monitoring of family farms to strengthen family farm related public policies
(ROPPA, 2015). At the workshop, some leaders of the various country platforms shared experiences
of their attempts in classifying family farming systems, developing rural identity cards and marking
out agroecological zones. This enabled the leaders to have a better view of the regional diversity of
family farms and how to approach such observations, but also, presented several challenges in their
desires to harmonize the tools of data gathering and results for policymaking.
Indeed, addressing issues of agrarian change uncovers some of the contradictions likely to arise
from diﬀerentiated interests, as well as provoke debates on issues of representativeness and class alli-
ances within food sovereignty movements. Nonetheless, doing so will bring signiﬁcant beneﬁts to the
cause of food sovereignty. First, it helps to present nuanced claims regarding the adverse impacts of
land grabs. In other words, to draw attention to the variegated forms of adversities among the mar-
ginalized; beyond family farmers to other classes and social groups that may suﬀer distinct forms of
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dispossession and exploitation across diﬀerent timelines and space. Second, it will enable movements
to engage with structural issues that facilitate land grabs, mainly, the underlying constraints that
make them attractive to marginalized groups as well as the institutions that create the enabling
environment for such investments at the expense of the livelihoods of the rural working people.
Third, the changing ideologies, values, and perspectives on agrarian futures could also be a reference
point in education for food sovereignty in peasant communities. We do not have to simply assume
that family farming practices are inherently agroecological, especially given that nowadays states
promote cheap and subsidized inﬂow of agrochemicals. ROPPA’s knowledge-sharing platforms,
including the periodic farmers’ university and the Woman’s College, could explore these possibili-
ties. Values that are shaped by the broad socio-economic contexts of peasants may transcend the
capacities of food sovereignty movements. However, it reminds us that perhaps food sovereignty
construction must go hand-in-hand with general improvements in the socio-economic conditions
of rural working people.
Notes
1. As an idea advanced broadly through La Vía Campesina a global peasant movement for agrarian justice.
2. Network of Peasant Organizations and producers in West Africa.
3. From western Senegal to eastern Nigeria, and including portions of Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea,
Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin.
4. http://www.landmatrix.org/en/
5. http://www.cadfund.com
6. https://landmatrix.org/
7. Except Nigeria and Cape Verde, but there are alliances from these two countries.
8. Quoted in (Losch, 2004),
9. https://viacampesina.org
10. See Koita, (2013) and Losch (2004) on ROPPA’s inﬂuential role in leading the resistance by smallholder
cotton farmers against unfair international trade policies.
11. President of ROPPA.
12. https://nyeleni.org/
13. In the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone, the civil wars of the 1990s inﬂuenced the urbanisation of the youth.
14. This is also a general concern for most people interviewed, and it is linked to the broad structural and
socio-economic inequality.
15. It is worth noting that in this case, there is a variegated dispossession eﬀect –due to relative land avail-
ability and access to alternative lands (although with diﬀerentiated degrees of access and control-
broadly, between sharecropping settlers and native landowners), that helps to maintain their basic sub-
sistence ethic.
16. http://www.mafs-africa.org
17. A staple legume in Ghana.
18. https://rwr.fm/interviews/ghana-government-sued-over-gmo-commercialization/
19. Like PFAG, the GNAFF is part of the larger Ghana Federation of Agricultural Producers (GFAP) which
is the Ghana Farmers Platform represented in ROPPA.
20. https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2017/January-23rd/farmers-back-agric-minister-designate-to-
take-up-job-despite-opposition.php
21. Lands held under the custody of traditional chiefs and kings.
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